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Abstract
In the 1990s, in many countries, log wages became a more convex function of
education: returns to college increased and returns to intermediate education declined.
This paper argues that an important cause of this convexi￿cation was a two-stage
demand-supply interaction: an increased demand for both sorts of educated workers
stimulated a supply response; the increased supply of intermediate-educated further
increased the demand for college-educated workers, because these two types of labour
are complementary. This argument is supported by an empirical equilibrium model of
savings and educational choices for Mexico, where the degree of convexi￿cation was
ampli￿ed by loosening credit constraints.
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11 Introduction
The changes in wage inequality observed in the 1990s in many countries have been char-
acterized by divergent trends in upper- and lower-tail inequality: the 90th-50th percentile
ratio of hourly wages increased, while the 50th-10th ratio declined or increased much less.1
Inequality between education groups has also grown faster in the top half than in the bottom
half of the distribution. Starting from a linear relationship between log earnings and the
number of years of completed education, the wage pro￿le convexi￿ed, with the returns to
college education rising sharply and the returns to intermediate levels of education decreas-
ing or remaining largely unchanged. This pattern has been documented both for the US and
for a number of developing countries.2
E⁄orts to explain this pattern up to now have focused on the US, where the changes in
relative wages were much smaller than in any of the other countries where the convexi￿cation
has been documented.3 The main suggested explanation has been increasing returns to
college in a model where the supply of education is taken as given and there are heterogeneous
returns to schooling (Deschenes, 2002 and Lemieux, 2006). The reason of this rise in the
returns to college as opposed to other observed and unobserved measures of skills remains
un-understood.
This paper suggests a di⁄erent (though not necessarily inconsistent) explanation for the
observed convexi￿cation. The argument is based on a two-way interaction between the
demand and the supply of education. An initial increase in the demand of workers with
intermediate and college education increased the returns to both these two types of educated
1See Goos and Manning (2003) for the UK, Autor, Katz and Kearney (2006) and Goldin and Katz (2007)
for the US, Spitz-Oener (2006) for West Germany, Binelli and Attanasio (2009) for Mexico. More generally,
mounting evidence suggests that the growth in wage inequality observed in the 1990s in many countries has
been increasingly concentrated at the top end of the wage distribution (Feenberg and Poterba, 2000 and
Piketty and Saez, 2003 for the US, Atkinson, 2002 for the UK, Banerjee and Piketty, 2005 for India, and
Piketty, 2005 for France).
2See Deschenes (2002) and Lemieux (2006, 2007) for the US, Schady (2001) for the Philippines, Bouillon,
Legovini and Lustig (2005) for Mexico, S￿derbom, Teal, Wambugu and Kahyarara (2006) for Kenya and
Tanzania, Liu (2007) for Vietnam, and Lopez Boo (2008) for Argentina.
3Using data from the US Current Population Survey Lemieux (2007) show that between 1989 and 1999
the high school graduates-high school dropouts wag gap barely changed while the college-high school wage
gap increased by around six per cent for males and seven per cent for females. Consistently with these
small changes in relative wages, the changes in the relative supply of workers with high school and college
education have also been modest (Goldin and Katz, 2007).
2workers and therefore gave incentives to invest in human capital. The increased supply of
intermediate-educated workers further increased the demand for college-educated workers
(and therefore the returns to college) since intermediate and college-educated workers are
complementary in production. As a result, the returns to college increased and the returns
to intermediate education declined. The increase of the supply of intermediate-educated
workers can be explained with a relaxation of the credit constraints to the supply of human
capital, which in turn determined the extent of the convexi￿cation.
An empirical innovation of this paper is to study the causes of convexi￿cation in a place
where it was far more pronounced than in the US, namely Latin America. Between 1987 and
2002 in Brazil, Colombia and Mexico, which together accounted for over seventy per cent of
the region￿ s GDP, the higher (college or more)-intermediate (high school) wage di⁄erential
increased on average by more than forty-￿ve per cent and the intermediate-basic (compul-
sory education) wage di⁄erential declined by over twenty-￿ve per cent. The mean wage at
intermediate level fell absolutely. These changes in wages were accompanied by signi￿cant
changes in the supply of education. Compulsory education became almost universal and
the proportion of people who completed high school increased from around 32 to 48 per
cent.4 The proportion of college graduates went from an average of 13 per cent in 1987 to
an average of 18 per cent in 2002.5
These supply changes could in theory have caused the convexi￿cation by altering the
composition of intermediate-educated workers, and in particular by a decline in the average
ability of these workers due to the expansion of the size of this group. However, I show that
this was not the case in Mexico, for either observable (such as cohort, sector of employment
and work experience) or unobservable (ability or quality of the workers) characteristics.
Then, I develop a model to quantify the importance of the changes in the prices of education
as the proximate cause of the convex shift. The education prices are the market value
of completing a given education level independently of any (observable and unobservable)
4In the year 1987 the proportion of the adult population with completed secondary education was 32
per cent in Brazil, 34 per cent in Colombia and 30 per cent in Mexico. In the year 2002 these proportions
increased, respectively, to 55, 43, 45 per cent.
5In the year 1987 the proportion of college graduates among the adult population was around 12 per cent
in Brazil, 17 per cent in Colombia and 10 per cent in Mexico. In the year 2002 these proportions increased
to, respectively, 14, 21 and 17 per cent.
3individual characteristic and they change as a result of movements in the demand and in the
supply of education.
The setting is an incomplete market, dynamic model of savings and educational choices
where the interest rate is taken as given and the education prices are the marginal produc-
tivities of three human capital aggregates - basic, intermediate and higher education - that
build up the economy human capital endowment. Education (and savings) choices are taken
by altruistic parents that face credit constraints. Individual wages are a function of the level
of education, an insurable i.i.d. shock and an endowment of ability that is received at birth
and is perfectly transmitted across generations. The key model feature is embedded in the
production function that is modelled as a ￿ exible CES which allows for di⁄erent elasticities
of substitution between human capital￿ s pairs.
I estimate the wage equations and the production function using micro data from Mexico
between 1987 and 2002 and I calibrate the rest of the parameters. The key result of the
estimation concerns the production function. I ￿nd that the substitution elasticities are
consistent with the complementarity between intermediate and higher education. I also ￿nd
that the demand for skilled labor increased by an average of 1.35 per cent a year, which
con￿rms the ￿ndings of an extensive empirical literature that found an increased demand
for skilled labour in Latin America in the 1990s (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2004 and Winters,
McCulloch and McKay, 2004, Manacorda, Sanchez-Paramo and Schady, 2006).
I use the economy calibrated in 1987 as the baseline model and I solve for the steady
state skill prices. Then, I take the increased demand for skilled labor as the exogenous shock
and I compute the equilibrium skill prices under di⁄erent scenarios characterized by this
increased demand for skilled labor and di⁄erent levels of credit constraints.
The simulations show the mechanism at work: ￿rst, in the presence of complementarities
between workers with intermediate and higher education, in addition to the standard supply
e⁄ect the growth of the supply of intermediate education increases the relative demand for
higher education and therefore its marginal product while it decreases the relative return of
intermediate with respect to basic education; second, the drop of the level of the wage at
intermediate is due to a relaxation of the credit constraints on the supply of human capital:
the availability of borrowing to pay for the costs of education determines the extent of the
4supply increase at intermediate and therefore the size of the drop in the wage at this level.
The model is able to reproduce the main facts that characterize the growth of both the
relative wages and the level of wages by education observed in Mexico in the 1990s.
The results con￿rm the ￿ndings of Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998) and Lee and
Wolpin (2006) that the feedback impact of changes in the supply of skills on their prices
is an important determinant of the evolution of wage inequality. What this paper adds is
showing that accounting for the equilibrium e⁄ects of changes in the prices and supply of
education is crucial to explain not only the changes in the relative wages but also in the
level of wages. And, in doing so, the framework proposed here is able to identify the main
mechanisms that drive these changes. In this regard, the inclusion of savings under credit
constraints is an important di⁄erence with respect to both Heckman, Lochner and Taber
(1998) and Lee and Wolpin (2006) and a crucial model feature to explain the evolution of
wage inequality.6
The mechanism proposed here identi￿es the complementarities between workers with
intermediate and higher education as a fundamental determinant of the convex shift. A
recent contribution by Autor, Katz and Kearney (2006) (AKK - hereafter) does also point
at production complementarities between middle and high-skilled workers as an important
determinant of changes in wage inequality. In their model AKK take the supply of skills as
exogenously given and use US data to provide some supporting empirical evidence to the
qualitative predictions of the model.7 Di⁄erently from AKK this paper allows the supply of
skills to react to the changes in the wage returns and the model is brought to the data for
a quantitative assessment of how much the complementarities can explain of the observed
changes in the wage di⁄erentials.
Finally, the results of this paper provide an empirical test of the long run theory of
6A paper that develops an equilibrium model of savings and educational choices with credit constraints
is Gallipoli, Meghir and Violante (2007). The model of Gallipoli et al. has a much richer structure than
the one developed here and it does address a very di⁄erent question: they study the long run e⁄ects of
policy interventions on educational choices and the distribution of earnings. The change in wage inequality
associated with a particular policy is an outcome measure to assess the performance of an education policy.
7In their model computerization represents the exogenous shock that they assume to be a perfect sub-
stitute to middle-skilled workers. Assuming that middle-skilled workers are more complementary to high
than to low-skilled, a fall in computer prices displaces middle-skilled workers and leads to a polarization of
employment and earnings. The authors themselves recognize that endogenous skill responses could o⁄set
some of the impacts of computer price￿ s decline on wage inequality.
5equilibrium wage functions developed by Mookherjee and Ray (2008). In an equilibrium
model of savings and occupational choices, they derive the theoretical prediction of a convex
relationship between the skill-intensity of an occupation and its marginal rate of return,
which has broad implications concerning the role of the markets in generating persistent
inequality.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some empirical
evidence on changes in wage inequality in Latin America in the 1990s. Section 3 presents
the model and de￿nes the equilibrium. Section 4 discusses the estimation and calibration of
the model. Section 5 presents the main results from the simulations. Section 6 discusses the
model￿ s assessment. Section 7 gives some concluding remarks. Appendix A describes the
main dataset used in the empirical analysis. Appendix B gives details of the method used to
solve the model. Appendix C presents the results of the model￿ s estimation and calibration.
2 Wage convexi￿cation in Latin America
Figure 1 presents the mean log hourly real wage in Brazil, Colombia and Mexico at the end
of the 1980s and in 2002. In each of the three countries the convexi￿cation is apparent:
in the 1990s wages have become a more convex function of the level of education.8 The
wage premium to higher education is substantial: in 2002 it is over one hundred per cent
in Brazil and Colombia and around sixty-￿ve per cent in Mexico. In addition, the premium
has been rising over time, with an increase of around thirty per cent in Brazil and Colombia
and of over seventy per cent in Mexico. At the same time intermediate graduates have lost
ground. From a value of around ninety-three per cent in Brazil and ￿fty-￿ve and forty-￿ve
per cent in Colombia and Mexico at the end of the 1980s, by the year 2002 relative wages
at intermediate with respect to basic education decreased by around forty per cent in Brazil
and twenty-two and ￿fteen per cent in Colombia and Mexico. The double change in the
relative wages that characterizes the convexi￿cation was driven by a drop in the level of the
8The convexity of the wage pro￿le changes the typical concave shape of the wage functions in Latin
America in the 1970s and 1980s, which were characterized by decreasing returns to higher education (Patrinos
and Psacharopoulos, 2004).
6Figure 1: Convexi￿cation of the Wage Pro￿le in Latin America (Source: author￿ s calcula-
tions based on the national household survey for Brazil and Colombia and the employment
survey for Mexico. Adult population aged 25-60. Basic education is up to uncompleted
secondary, intermediate education is up to uncompleted college, and higher education is at
least completed college.)


























































































wage at intermediate that fell below the value at the end of the 1980s. Between 1987 and
2002 the mean wage at intermediate education decreased in real terms by three and two per
cent in Brazil and Colombia and by as much as ￿ve per cent in Mexico.9
Surprisingly, the empirical literature on Latin America so far has focused on the increase
in the premium to college rather than on the convexi￿cation and has explained this rise in
9For each of the three countries the di⁄erence of the mean real wages by education between the two years
is highly statistically signi￿cant. A test of the increase of the relative wage at higher education and the
decline of the relative wage at intermediate education also returns highly signi￿cant results.
7the returns to college with changes either in the supply or in the demand for skills.10 On the
contrary, this paper focuses on the convexi￿cation and the results will show the importance
of investigating the role of the interactions between the demand and the supply of education
to explain it.
A ￿rst possibility is that the convex shift was due to changes in the composition of
observable or unobservable characteristics of the cohorts that entered the labor market in
the 1990s. As for observables, the estimation of wage equations that control for labor market
experience, gender, sector of employment and their interaction with the level of education
show that the wage pro￿les are qualitatively very similar to the ones reported in Figure
1.11 As for unobservables, changes in the ability composition of the education groups and
in particular a decline in the average ability of intermediate-educated workers as a result
of the expansion of the size of this group could have reduced the wage at this level of
education substantially and made the wage pro￿le convexi￿ed. The next section discusses
this possibility.
2.1 Preliminary evidence of changes in prices versus ability
There are two preliminary ways to assess the importance of changes in ability to explain
changes in observed wages. First, we can compare the evolution of the relative returns to
education for the cohorts of graduates that made their education choices before 1987 with
the relative returns of those cohorts that invested in education during the 1990s. The graphs
in Figure 1 report the mean log hourly real wages for all individuals aged between 25 and 60.
Assuming that investment in education ends at age 25 and that the individuals enter into
the labor market at the end of the education period if not before, we can divide the 25-60
age sample in two groups. The ￿rst group is made up by the individuals that made all their
schooling decisions before 1987, that is by all individuals that are older than forty in 2002; the
second group is made up by those that are between 25 and 40 years old in 2002. If changes
10One exception is Robbins (1996) who applies the approach developed by Katz and Murphy (1992) to
analyze the changes in the relative wages and in the relative supply of education for a number of Latin
American countries. However, he only consideres two education groups - skilled and unskilled workers - once
more focusing exclusively on the changes in the wage premium to higher education.
11All results are available from the author upon request.
8in ability composition at intermediate and higher education are driving the convexi￿cation,
the wage pro￿le of those that made all their schooling decisions before 1987 and were in the
labor market by then should not have convexi￿ed during the 1990s. Unreported results show
that in 2002 the wage pro￿le convexi￿ed for both age groups: changes in ability composition
do not seem to be driving the convexi￿cation.
Second, we can look at changes in relative wages within the same birth cohort. If changes
in relative wages are explained by changes in the ability composition due to the entrance
of new cohorts in the labor market, there should be no changes in relative wages within
a given birth cohort. If there are changes and they follow a pattern similar to the ones
observed between cohorts, then changes in wages must be a re￿ ection of changes in the
relative prices of skills rather than changes in the ability of workers with di⁄erent levels of
education. Unreported results show that the convexi￿cation of the wage pro￿le observed in
the 1990s in the sample that includes many cohorts as plotted in Figure 1 is the same as the
one found when considering the mean wages by level of education at the beginning and at
the end of the 1990s for a given birth cohort.
All empirical evidence discussed so far suggests that the convexi￿cation was not driven
by changes in the composition of individuals￿observable or unobservable characteristics.12
Therefore, changes in the prices of education, that is in the component of the observed wages
that is independent of any individual characteristic, appear as an appealing explanation of
the convexi￿cation. The rest of the paper will develop a model to quantify the importance
of the changes in the prices of education to explain the convex shift. The model has two
key features: (1) educational and saving choices are jointly made under credit constraints
on the supply of human capital; (2) the production function allows for di⁄erent degrees of
substitutability/complementarity between aggregate human capitals.
12This con￿rms the ￿ndings of Jacoby and Skou￿as (2002) for Mexico and Binelli, Meghir and Menezes-
Filho (2009) for Brazil that changes in ability composition can only account for part of the increase in the
observed college premium.
93 The model
At each time t the economy consists of overlapping generations of parents and children that
live together for four periods: a pre-school period and three periods necessary to complete
the three education levels - basic, intermediate and higher education. At t = 1 each cohort
schooling and wealth distribution are taken as exogenous initial conditions. From t = 2 these
distributions evolve endogenously as a result of parental maximizing behavior.
3.1 Supply side: household decision problem
A continuum of individuals is born at each time t. Each individual lives for eight periods,
four as a child and four as a parent. As a child the individual lives with the parent that
works full time and maximizes utility which is a function of joint household consumption.
In the ￿rst two periods consumption is the only choice variable. In the ￿rst period the child
is in pre-school, in the second period is sent to compulsory basic education. In the third and
fourth period the child can be sent either to school or to work. If the child is sent to school,
the parent has to pay a ￿xed cost that is education-speci￿c. If sent to work, the child works
full time and gives her earnings to the parent. At the end of the fourth period the parent
retires and leaves a bequest of ￿nancial assets to the child. The child starts the adult life
with the level of education completed during childhood and an amount of assets given by
parental bequest.
Labor supply is perfectly inelastic and wages clear the labor markets. The wage of an
individual i with education level j and age a in period t is given by:
w
i
j;a;t = pj;t ￿ exp(e
i










where j = 1;2;3 denotes the education level from basic up to higher education. pj;t is
the price of a unit of human capital of type j at time t; it is determined as the marginal
product of the aggregate supply of education level j in period t. ei
j;a;t denotes labor e¢ ciency
10of individual i, which is a function of ￿i, the individual￿ s ability endowment, gj(agei
t), an
education-speci￿c polynomial in age which re￿ ects the growth of wages with experience,
and zi
j;a;t, an education-speci￿c i.i.d. uninsurable shock that is assumed to be normally
distributed with mean ￿zj;a;t and variance ￿2
zj;a;t. The uninsurable shock is received in each
period and is a proxy of earnings￿volatility and uncertainty.
The individual￿ s ability endowment, ￿i, represents the permanent component of human
capital. It is a measure of ability and all unobservable family background factors that have
a permanent impact on human capital formation. It is assumed to be perfectly transmitted
between successive generations: each individual inherits at birth the ability endowment of
her parent and passes it over to her own child.13
In order to solve the household maximization problem the adults (parents) need to form
expectations on current and future skill prices, which determine wages. Let us de￿ne as
pt(a) the vector of current and future skill prices forecasted from age a onwards. Omitting























a + 1 if Ia = 1
jC
a if Ia = 0
￿
8 a = a ￿ 1;a (5)
Aa ￿ ￿Ba 8 a = a;:::;a ￿ 1 (6)
Aa ￿ 0 a = a (7)
where Xa denotes the vector of state variables at age a, which includes the level of
adult education, jP, that is ￿xed throughout adulthood, the level of child education, jC
a ,
13The assumption of perfect transmissibility of ability from parents to children is motivated by the empirical
evidence from Latin America. The correlation between proxies for the ability level of parents and children is
high. As an example, data from the Mexican Family Life Survey in 2002 shows that the correlation between
the Raven test of the mother (or father) and their children is above eighty per cent.
11the amount of assets at age a, Aa, the vector of current and future skill prices forecasted
from age a onwards, p(a), the ability endowment, ￿, and the idiosyncratic shock to wages,
za. Then Xa = (jP;jC
a ;Aa;p(a);￿;za), with jC
a normalized to zero when consumption is the
only choice variable. ￿ is the degree of parental altruism, a (a) denotes the age of the parent
at start (end) of the adult life and Va(:) is the child￿ s lifetime utility once adult.
ca and Aa denote, respectively, joint household consumption and ￿nancial assets at age a.
wjP;a is parental wage at age a given parental education level jP. Ia is an indicator function
taking the value of one when the child is sent to school and zero otherwise. If the child is
sent to work, the parent receives the child￿ s wage, wjC;a. If the child is sent to school, the
parent pays the ￿xed costs, FjC, for the jC schooling level attended by the child. E denotes
expectations that re￿ ect uncertainty due to the presence of the uninsurable idiosyncratic
shocks to earnings, z. ￿ is the discount factor. The utility function is assumed to be
strictly increasing and concave in consumption, so that absolute risk aversion is decreasing
in individual￿ s wealth, the impact of risk on investment decisions being higher for poorer
than for wealthier households.14
The optimization problem described in (3) is solved under four main constraints. The
￿rst constraint (equation (4)) is a standard period budget constraint with the term in square
brackets switching on when child education becomes a choice variable. The second constraint
(equation (5)) de￿nes the law of motion of child￿ s education. The third constraint (equation
(6)) is a borrowing restriction imposing a limit Ba on the amount of net indebtedness at age
a. The fourth constraint (equation (7)) is a terminal condition that prevents parents from
dying in debt: they can not leave debts to their children.
The borrowing limit, Ba, can take any value between zero, which corresponds to the
maximum level of credit constraints of no possible borrowing, and an upper bound that is
given by the present discounted value of lifetime earnings at age a under the lowest possible
realization of individual labor e¢ ciency, that is under the lowest possible realization of
the idiosyncratic shock z.15 The upper bound represents the maximum amount that an





where ￿ is the reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
15The empirical distribution of zj is de￿ned over a ￿nite support with a minimum value, zj, and a maximum
value, zj. Therefore, wages are assumed to be always positive and di⁄erent from zero.
12individual will always be able to repay without violating the no-debt condition speci￿ed in
equation (7).16
3.2 Demand side: aggregate production function
The representative ￿rm operates a constant returns to scale technology over physical and
human capital. I assume that there are no adjustment costs for physical and human capital






where Yt denotes aggregate output, Kt is aggregate physical capital and HHt is aggregate
human capital.17 ￿ denotes the share of physical capital in production which is assumed to
be constant over time and Zt is the technology factor that is normalized to one in all years.18
I assume that the economy is small and open to the world ￿nancial markets. Capital ￿ ows
in or out of the country so that the marginal product of physical capital equals the world
interest rate, r.19
I consider three types of human capital corresponding to the three education levels that
the individuals can complete and I specify the aggregate human capital in year t, HHt, as
a nested CES function over the three types of human capital, H1;H2;H3, which represent,
respectively, the human capital of those completing basic, intermediate and higher education.
The choice of how to combine the three human capital inputs in the HH aggregate de-
termines the elasticity of substitution (ES) between the H factors, which drives the direction
16The value of the upper bound arises naturally from the assumption that the utility function satis￿es the
Inada condition lim
c!0
U(c) = ￿1 and that parents have to repay all debts before retiring.
17This speci￿cation of the production function assumes that there are no complementarities between
physical and human capital. This assumption is motivated by the near-constancy of the share of physical
capital in production estimated for LACs in the 1990s (Bosworth, 1998, Harrison, 1996 and Ho⁄man, 1993).
18Given the assumption of no population growth and the normalization of Z, there is no growth in steady
state. Growth in the model will only occur during the transition towards a steady state as a result of the
reallocation of e¢ ciency units of labor from less to more productive combinations of the di⁄erent types of
human capital.
19In the absence of aggregate shocks, the constancy of the world interest rate implies that the economy￿ s
physical to human capital ratio is ￿xed over time. Also, this assumtion implies that ￿rms face no credit
constraints. Di⁄erently from individual households, they can freely borrow in the international capital
markets at the ￿xed rate r. There are no ￿nancial intermediaries that can borrow money from ￿rms and
lend it to households.
13and the magnitude of the equilibrium e⁄ects. I choose a ￿ exible speci￿cation for the aggre-
gate human capital that allows for di⁄erent elasticities of substitution (ES) between human
capitals￿pairs. A convenient way to allow for a di⁄erent ES between pairs of human capital
is to combine them within a CES speci￿cation. I use the CES speci￿cation because it is
simple, has few parameters and restricts the substitution elasticities to be constant.20
Given three human capital inputs, there are three ways of nesting them within a CES ag-
gregate: g HH1 = ￿1(H3;￿2(H2;H1)); g HH2 = ￿2(H2;￿2(H3;H1)) and g HH3 = ￿3(H1;￿2(H2;H3)),
where ￿1, ￿2 and ￿3 are CES aggregators. The CES functional form imposes symmetry re-
strictions on substitution elasticities. For g HH1, the ES between H3 and H1 is restricted to be
the same as the one between H3 and H2. For g HH2, the ES between H2 and H3 is restricted
to be the same as the one between H2 and H1. These restrictions contrast with factor elastic-
ities previously estimated for LACs which show that the ES between higher and intermediate
education di⁄ers from the one between either higher or intermediate and basic education.21
Therefore, HHt is speci￿ed as it follows:







where Hu;t and Hs;t are, respectively, the human capital aggregate for unskilled and
skilled labour at time t:
Hu;t corresponds to H1;t and Hs is given by:







The time-varying and skill-speci￿c parameters ￿ and ￿ in equation (9) and (10) denote
the shares of the human capital factors in production. Changes in ￿ and ￿ re￿ ect variations
in the productivity and in the demand of the di⁄erent inputs. The parameter ￿ determines
the ES between unskilled and skilled labor, which is given by ESu;s = ES1;2 = ES1;3 = 1
1￿￿,
20An alternative to the CES is the translog function. However, the translog has many more parameters
to estimate, which would signi￿cantly reduce the degrees of freedom in an already small sample.
21See Manacorda, Sanchez-Paramo and Schady (2006).
14while ￿ determines the ES between intermediate and higher education, which is given by
ES2;3 = 1
1￿￿.22 If either ￿ or ￿ is zero, the corresponding nesting is Cobb-Douglas. If
￿ > ￿, the elasticity of substitution between higher and intermediate is lower than the
one between either higher or intermediate and basic education, which means that there are
complementarities in production between intermediate and higher education.
The labor input is measured in e¢ ciency units: each input type is the product of the
raw number of labor units of that type and the e¢ ciency index de￿ned in equation (2).
The aggregate stock of human capital j in year t, Hj;t, is given by the sum of the e¢ ciency






i;t j = be;ie;he (11)
where h
j
i;t is the supply of education level j of individual i in year t expressed in e¢ ciency
units.
Di⁄erently from physical capital, labor is not internationally mobile and its remunera-
tion is set domestically. Under the assumption of perfectly competitive markets and pro￿t
maximization by ￿rms, the price for education level j in year t, pj;t, is given by the marginal
product of the jth aggregate human capital:




































By taking the ratios of the equations above, I can derive the expressions for the relative
22There are di⁄erent ways of measuring the ES when the aggregate output is produced with more than
two inputs. We use the de￿nition of the direct ES. One alternative commonly used de￿nition is the Allen
elasticity of substituion. The direct elasticity of substitution between Intermediate and Higher Education
is solely a function of the curvature parameter, ￿, while the Allen de￿nition involves both the curvature














































where equations (15), (16) and (17) de￿ne, respectively, the relative returns to interme-
diate versus basic, higher versus intermediate and higher versus basic education.
The degree of complementarity between intermediate and higher education is an impor-
tant determinant of the changes in relative returns. An increase in the amount of human
capital at intermediate level has two di⁄erent e⁄ects: a standard supply e⁄ect (SE) and a
complementarity e⁄ect (CE). The standard SE is clear from the human capitals￿ratio in
round brackets in equation (15) and (16). For a given supply of basic and higher human
capital, an increase in H2 decreases the relative return to intermediate with respect to basic
education and increases the relative return to higher with respect to intermediate education.
The CE is given by the term in curly brackets in equation (15) and (17). If ￿ > ￿, that is if
higher and intermediate education are more complementary than higher and basic (or inter-
mediate and basic), an increase in H2 further decreases the relative return to intermediate
with respect to basic education and increases the relative return to higher with respect to
basic education.
Activities of the government are not central to the analysis. The government neither
collects taxes nor redistributes them.
3.3 Equilibrium
Given an initial distribution of ability, ￿nancial assets and education and the world in-
terest rate, r, a competitive equilibrium is given by a sequence of vectors of skill prices,
16pt = [p1;t;p2;t;p3;t], aggregate labor inputs, Ht = [H1;t;H2;t;H3;t], parental decision rules
for consumption and education choices, [ca;t;Ia;t], individual labor supply of education j,
ja;t, individual labor e¢ ciency, ej;a;t, age, time and education speci￿c measures, ’j;a;t, for
t = 0;1;2;:::, and a = a;:::;a such that:
1. Given the prices [p1;t;p2;t;p3;t], the contingent plans ca;t and Ia;t solve the household
maximization problem (3) subject to (4) to (7).












(ja;t(s) ￿ exp(ej;a;t))d’j;a;t(s) 8j
where S de￿nes the state vector at age a, time t, minus the education states, i.e. S ￿
(Aa;t;pt(a);￿;za;t).
An equilibrium steady state is a competitive equilibrium with stationary prices and dis-
tributions, that is an equilibrium such that [pt;Ht] = [p;H] for all t.
A standard solution method based on backward recursion and value function iterations
is used to solve the model and to compute the equilibrium steady state. The full solution
method is described in Appendix B.
4 Estimation and calibration
This section discusses how I parametrize the model economy. I ￿rst estimate the wage
equations and the production function. Then, given the estimated parameters, I calibrate
the rest of the parameters.
I estimate the model using data from Mexico that together with changes in the supply of
education was characterized by signi￿cant changes in the demand for it.23 Mexico provides
23During the 1990s Mexico promoted a series of economic reforms that changed the structure of production
17a very good example of the reform e⁄ort that characterized Latin America in the 1990s and
resulted into an increased demand for skilled labor in production.24
4.1 Estimation
4.1.1 Wage equations
In order to estimate the parameters characterizing the wage equations and the structure
of the error term as speci￿ed in equation (1) and (2), I would need a panel data set with
individual information on wages, a measure of permanent heterogeneity with a measurable
impact on wages, such as individual test scores, and age, spanning over many years. However,
for Mexico there are no available data sets that follow individuals over many years.25 Also,
until 2004 there were no standardized measures of test scores.26 The only available data
set with information on wages and a panel dimension following individuals over the 1990s
is the Mexican Employment Survey, the ENEU (Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano). A
description of the ENEU is presented in Appendix A.
The ENEU collects wage information on the Mexican urban population of workers at
least twelve years old over ￿ve consecutive quarters, the four quarters of a given year and
the ￿rst of the following year. I consider the four quarters of a given year and I specify the
and made the economy more open to foreign investment. The reform e⁄ort culminated in 1994 when Mexico
became a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and entered
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the US and Canada. In 1994 Mexico was also
hit by a severe ￿nancial crisis, the "Peso crisis", which resulted into a massive devaluation of the national
domestic currency. Verhoogen (2008) ￿nds that it was the Peso crisis more than any economic reform that
resulted into an increase in the use of skilled labor. Overall, disregarding the speci￿c mechanism through
which it happened, all contributions agree that in the 1990s Mexico underwent a structural change towards
the use of skilled labor in production.
24Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004) and Winters, McCulloch and McKay (2004) provide two exhaustive surveys
of the literature.
25The ￿rst survey that collects individual information on wages in Mexico over many years is the Mexican
Family Life Survey (MxFLS). The ￿rst wave of the MxFLS was collected in 2002 and it was followed by a
second wave in 2005; two additional waves are scheduled for 2009 and 2012. At present only the ￿rst two
waves are available.
26Non-standardized test scores were collected in Mexico since 1998 (Estandares Nacionales). In 2001 the
ENLACE (ENgaging LAtino Communities for Education) initiative was launched to support Latino students
to progress from primary to secondary and college education. Standardized test scores started to be collected
as part of ENLACE in 2004.
18following log wage equation for individual i with education level j in quarter qr:
lnw
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j;qr is the log hourly real wage of individual i with education level j in quarter
qr, lnwj;qr is the mean log wage among those with education level j in quarter qr and re￿ ect
average productivity of workers with the j level of education, gj(:) is an education-speci￿c
quadratic polynomial in age that proxies for experience in the labor market, ￿i is a permanent
individual-speci￿c e⁄ect and zi
j;qr is an i.i.d. shock received by the individual i with education
level j in quarter qr.
I construct panels of individuals by matching workers by the position in an identi￿ed
household, the number of years of education and age. I consider all wage workers between
the age of 15 (minimum legal working age) and 60 (average retirement age) and I follow
them over the four successive quarters in a given year. For each year of the sample between
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where the upper-bar variables denote time averages over the four quarters in a given
year. lnwi
j is the average log wage over the four quarters for the ith individual with the jth
education level, lnwj is the mean log wage over the four quarters for education level j. The
term (lnwj;qr ￿ lnwj) is modelled as quarter-education dummies￿interactions. gj(agei
qr) is
an education-speci￿c quadratic polynomial in age.
For the purposes of the model￿ s simulations we require the unconditional distribution of









19where T(i) is the total number of observations available on individual i. The estimated
￿xed-e⁄ects give an estimate of the distribution of ￿ for the working population.27 The
results of the estimation are reported in Appendix C.28
4.1.2 Production function
The identi￿cation of the parameters of the production function requires knowledge of the
aggregate human capitals, which are the sum of the e¢ ciency weighted labor supply of
workers with a given level of education. The e¢ ciency index de￿ned in equation (2) is
intrinsically unobserved. The method used to approximate the aggregate human capital
series combines di⁄erent information sources as in Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998).
Let us de￿ne the wage bill WBj;t as the total earnings￿payments received by the indi-
viduals of a given education group in a given year. Then:
WBj;t = b pj;t ￿ b Hj;t j = 1;2;3 (23)
where b pj;t is the estimated market price of workers with education level j in year t and





j = 1;2;3 (24)
Normalizing to one the value of each of the b pj in 1987, it is possible to identify the series
of the utilized human capital stocks normalized to 1987.
In order to compute the wage bills we need a data set that is representative of the entire
Mexican population. The ENEU collects information on urban areas only so it can not be
used to this purpose. I use instead the ENIGH, that is nationally-representative and reports
individual earnings together with detailed information on assets and consumption. For each
year and education group I compute the wage bill by summing over the individual earnings
of all primary wage earners between the age of 15 and 60. I linearly interpolate the available
27The distribution of ability is taken to be time-invariant. I therefore abstract from any heterogeneity in
ability endownments between successive cohorts active in the labour market in di⁄erent years.
28The short length of the panel biases the estimates of the ￿xed e⁄ects. Section 6 will discuss the robustness
of the quantative importance of changes in the initial distribution of ability to produce the convexi￿cation.
20data for missing years. The total number of workers and the wage bills by level of education
are presented in Appendix C.
In order to obtain an estimate of the pj;t I run the ￿xed e⁄ect regression described in
equation (21) for each year between 1987 and 2002 and I compute the predicted mean log
hourly real wage for each education level net of the ￿xed e⁄ects, which gives an estimate of
the log skill prices by level of education in each year of the sample. Given the wage bills and
the (log) skill prices, I divide the wage bills by the exponentiated value of the skill prices to
obtain the time series of the human capital aggregates for each year and education group.
The identi￿cation of the H factors is then consistent with the ability distribution estimated
from the data and used to simulate the model.29 The estimated skill prices and human
capital series normalized to 1987 are presented in Appendix C.
Having a measure of the aggregate human capital series and of the education prices and
having assumed that the aggregate inputs are paid their marginal product, the ￿rst order
conditions of the ￿rms￿maximization problem (equation (12) to (14)) provide the structure
to identify the parameters of the production function. Following a wide literature on the
estimation of the production functions, which started with the seminal contribution of Katz
and Murphy (1992), I use the changes in the relative supply of education to identify the
changes in relative demand.
Log linearizing equation (16), I obtain:
(logp3;t ￿ logp2;t) = [log￿3;t ￿ log(1 ￿ ￿3;t)] + (￿ ￿ 1)(logH3;t ￿ logH2;t) (25)
where log￿j;t denotes the time series of the relative demand shifts for skill level j measured
in log quantity units.
By rewriting the above expression in terms of wage bills we obtain:
(logWB3;t ￿ logWB2;t) = [log￿3;t ￿ log(1 ￿ ￿3;t)] + ￿(log b H3;t ￿ log b H2;t) (26)
29Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998) assume that at older ages changes in wages are solely due to changes
in education prices and do not depend any more on ability. Therefore, to derive an estimate of the time
series of education prices they use the average wages by year and level of education for the workers aged 45
or more in their sample. By following the same procedure, we can estimate the skill price ratios by using
the mean log wages by education for the workers aged 45 or more in each ENEU wave. The main results of
the estimation of the production function remain unchanged.
21where b H3;t and b H2;t denote the estimates of the human capital of workers with, respec-
tively, higher and intermediate education at time t.
Equation (26) can be used to obtain a direct estimate of the elasticity of substitution
between higher and intermediate education. The time-varying factor shares ￿2;t and ￿3;t
re￿ ect changes in the productivity of and in the demand for workers with intermediate and
higher education. I express the log of the share parameters as the sum of a constant and a
time-varying component:
log￿j;t = ￿0;j + ￿1;j ￿ t + ej;t (27)
where ￿0;j is a skill-speci￿c constant, t denotes a linear time trend and ej;t is a normally
distributed i.i.d. shock at time t for skill level j.30
Combining equation (26) and (27), the value of the parameter determining the elasticity
of substitution between higher and intermediate education, ￿, can be estimated from a
regression of the ratio of log wage bills on the ratio of the human capital aggregates, a linear
trend and a constant. In order to correct for the endogeneity of the human capitals, I apply
an IV estimator using as instrument the ￿rst lag of the di⁄erence of the logs of the human
capital factors.
Then, I use equation (10) above to construct a measure of skilled human capital as a
weighted sum of workers with intermediate and higher education. To do so, I need an estimate
of the log factor shares ￿3;t. Given equation (26) and (27) and the fact that ￿2;t = (1￿￿3;t),









Finally, I can estimate a regression of the ratio of the log wage bills for skilled and
unskilled on the ratio of skilled and unskilled human capital, a linear trend and a constant
to obtain an estimate of ￿.
The results of the estimation are reported in Table 1. The table presents the estimates
obtained for higher versus intermediate education and for skilled versus unskilled. The last
row of the table reports the value of the implied elasticity of substitution, which is computed
as one over one minus the coe¢ cient of the di⁄erence of log H in the corresponding column.
30Given the spike in the wage bills in 1994, I tried alternative speci￿cations that allow the trend to vary
for the pre and post 1994 period. However, the interaction term was never signi￿cant.
22The magnitude of the ES reported in Table 1 is consistent with the results of the previous
empirical studies that have estimated a production function with three types of human
capital using data from Latin America.31
Parameter Higher versus Intermediate Skilled versus Unskilled
Di⁄erence log H 0:7726 0:8601
(0:0636) (0:1362)




Implied ES 4:4 7:1
Table 1: Estimation of the Production Function, Standard Errors in Parenthesis. Unskilled
are workers with basic education. Skilled is the sum of workers with intermediate and higher
education.
The implied ES between workers with higher and intermediate education is lower than
the one between workers with either higher or intermediate and basic education. This is
consistent with the presence of complementarities in production between workers with inter-
mediate and higher education.
A joint estimation of the system of equations to test for the equality of the coe¢ cients of
the log relative supplies con￿rms that ￿ and ￿ are statistically signi￿cantly di⁄erent. The test
gives a value of chi-squared of 7.1 with a P-value of 0.0077. I also test for the assumption
of equality between ES3;1 and ES2;1, which is a restriction imposed by the symmetry of
the CES operator. The test gives a value of chi-squared of 0.35 with a P-value of 0.5525.
Therefore, the test can not reject the null hypothesis of equal coe¢ cients.
The coe¢ cient of the time trend gives an estimate of the yearly relative demand of higher
with respect to intermediate-educated, (￿1;3 ￿ ￿1;2), and of skilled with respect to unskilled
labor, (￿1;s ￿￿1;u). I call (￿1;s ￿￿1;u) the "skill-bias" parameter. As can be seen from Table
1, I estimate an increase in the relative demand for skilled labour of around 1.35% a year.
31See Manacorda, Sanchez-Paramo and Schady (2006) that use a cross section of Latin American countries
that includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico. The estimated ES for Latin America are
signi￿cantly bigger than the typical values for the ES found in empirical studies that use US data (Katz and
Murphy, 1992).
234.2 Calibration
Given the estimation of the wage equations and the production function, I calibrate the
rest of the parameters. The complete list of the parameters together with their value, a
description and the target used in the calibration is reported in Figure 8 in Appendix C.
4.2.1 Initial distribution of wealth and education
I set the initial distribution of education using the 1987 wave of the ENEU. I divide the
workers into two categories: the adult population that is made up by all heads of households
aged between 25 and 60 with basic, intermediate and higher education and the population
of young living with their parents aged between 15 and 24 with completed basic and inter-
mediate education. I use the mean proportions by education in the adult population to set
the initial education distribution of the parents and the mean proportions of the young with
basic and intermediate education for the education distribution of the children in the third
and fourth periods. In the pre-school period all children have by de￿nition zero education.
In the second period they all complete compulsory basic education.
The ENEU does not record information on wealth. I use instead the Mexican Expenditure
Survey, the ENIGH (Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares), which is
available in 1984, 1987 and every two years since then and contains detailed information
on individuals￿consumption and assets. I set the initial wealth distribution to a lognormal
with mean and standard deviation computed from the distribution of ￿nancial assets of the
workers aged between 25 and 60 in 1992.32
4.2.2 Preferences and costs of schooling
The coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, ￿, is set to 0.9, which gives a value of around 1.1
for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS). The value is taken from Arrau and
van Wijnbergen (1991) that estimate for Mexico a value for the EIS between a lower bound
of 0.8 and an upper bound of 1.4. The limit on net indebtedness, B, is set to zero, which
32The ENIGH reached its ￿nal structure only in 1992 with signi￿cant changes in the questionnaire and
data collection in the years before. For this reason, I parametrize the wealth distribution using the ￿rst and
second moments of the 1992 instead of the 1987 wave. The results of the simulations are robust to matching
more moments of the wealth distribution and to relaxing the assumption of it being lognormal.
24corresponds to the maximum level of credit constraints. Consumption is adjusted to account
for the presence of the child. I use an equivalence scale equal to 0.7 for a child re￿ ecting the
average calories intake of a child relative to an adult as reported by the Mexican National
Nutritional Institute (HernÆndez, ChÆvez and Bourges, 1987). Assuming that parent-child
dynasties are linked by fully altruistic preferences, the altruism parameter, ￿, is set to one.
I set the values of the ￿xed costs of schooling, Fj, for each jth education level so that
the model matches the education distribution of the workers aged between 25 and 60 in the
ENEU in 1987. I ￿nd F1 = 0:035, F2 = 0:26 and F3 = 0:64, which implies that the costs
at intermediate level are around seven times the ones at primary and the costs at higher
education are around eighteen times the ones at primary.33
4.2.3 Interest rate and capital share
The value of the real interest rate, r, is set to a US benchmark value. I choose a value
of ￿ve per cent, which is the average real interest rate on the US 6-months Treasury Bills
published by the Federal Reserve Board for the period between the year 1990 and 2000.
Given an average working life of the adult Mexican population of approximately thirty
years, the model period is set to seven years. Therefore, the interest rate in the model is
r = (1:057 ￿ 1) ￿ = 0:41. Setting the yearly discount factor equal to the inverse of (1 + r),
￿ = 1:05￿7 ￿ = 0:71. The capital share, ￿, is set equal to 0.35, which is the average value
between the lower and the upper bound that has been estimated for LACs.34
33Education in Mexico is free in public schools while private education is expensive at all levels. The ENEU
does not record information on the type of school attended, so it is not possible to distinguish between public
and private schools. The Fj in the model measure the average total direct costs of education, which includes
fees, costs of school material and maintanance. An empirical counterpart of these costs is provided by the ￿rst
wave of the MxFLS, which collects high quality data on a rich set of variables for a cross section of Mexican
households in 2002. The Survey contains a detailed set of questions on education costs and distinguishes
between tuition fees, the costs of exams, books, school material, uniforms and the maintenance costs for
public and private schools. Summing over the di⁄erent categories and computing the mean for public and
private education, the costs of intermediate education are around eight times the ones at primary while the
ones at higher education are around nineteen times the ones at primary.
34See Bosworth (1998) for a discussion of the empirical issues involved in the estimation of the capital
share in Mexico and Harrison (1996) and Ho⁄man (1993) for two cross-countries empirical studies that use
a capital share that varies between the value of 0.3 and 0.4 for a group of LACs.
255 Simulations
In this section I simulate the model economy for a quantitative assessment of the role of the
two key components of the model to produce the convexi￿cation: the complementarities in
the production function and the joint education-savings decisions under credit constraints.
I de￿ne the baseline economy as the one characterized by the values of the parameters
estimated and calibrated for 1987. The baseline model matches the education shares observed
in Mexico in 1987 and it is characterized by a linear relationship between the prices and
the level of education. Then, I assess the impact of an exogenous increase in the demand
for skilled labor, which I call "skill-biased technological change" (SBTC hereafter), on the
education prices in di⁄erent scenarios.
I de￿ne two series of counterfactuals. First, I compute the impact of a SBTC by keeping
all structural parameters ￿xed at baseline values. The supply of education will react to the
increase in the demand of skilled labor and this will have an impact on the education prices.
The size and the direction of the equilibrium e⁄ects depend on the degree of substitutability
between the aggregate human capital. The estimation results in Table 1 show that the
elasticity of substitution between workers with intermediate and higher education is lower
than between any of these two groups and workers with basic education. I compare the
education prices at steady state that the model produces with the complementarities between
intermediate and higher education and without them, that is by assuming that the production
function is isoelastic with ESu;s = ES1;2 = ES1;3 = ES2;3 = 1
1￿￿.
Second, I assess the impact of a SBTC combined with a relaxation of the credit con-
straints.
5.1 Skill-biased technological change and no borrowing
A SBTC is modelled as a permanent increase of ￿s, which measures the contribution of
skilled labor to the production of the aggregate output. An increase in its value is to be
interpreted as an increase in the productivity or in the demand for skilled labor. The size
of the increase is given by the "skill-bias" parameter obtained from the estimation of the
production function. As shown in Table 2, I estimate a value of the "skill-bias" of around
261.35 per cent a year.35 I use the baseline value of ￿s in 1987 to de￿ne the no skill-biased
technological change scenario.36 Then, a SBTC is modelled as an increase of ￿s by 1.35 per
cent a year for ￿ve consecutive years and constant at the increased value from the sixth year
onwards.37



































I de￿ne a ￿rst counterfactual, Scenario I, which is characterized by a SBTC and all other
parameters ￿xed at baseline values. Figure 2 presents the equilibrium (log) skill prices in
the baseline model and in Scenario I. At baseline the model matches the education shares
in 1987 and produces a linear relationship between the log prices and the level of education.
Once the share of skilled labor increases, Scenario I results into a steep increase in both the
premium to higher and to intermediate education. As clear from equations (12) to (14) and
the fact that ￿u = (1￿￿s), an increase in ￿s decreases the equilibrium price at basic education
and increases the prices at both intermediate and at higher education. The increased prices
at intermediate and higher education give incentives to invest after compulsory schooling. As
35This is consistent with the previous results found for Latin American countries ( Manacorda, Sanchez-
Paramo and Schady, 2006).
36Using the wage bill equation for skilled and unskilled, the equivalent of equation (27) for ￿s;t and the
de￿nition of the unskilled labor share as one minus the skilled share, I can identify ￿s;t following the same
steps used to identify ￿3;t as explained in Section 4.1.2. For the year 1987, I obtain a baseline estimate of
0.55 for ￿3 and of 0.692 for ￿s.
37Simulating the model with increases of ￿s of longer and shorter duration produces qualitatively similar
results.
27expected and consistently with the ￿xed costs of education being lower at intermediate than
at higher education (F2 < F3), the supply of workers with intermediate education increases
more than the one of workers with higher education, so the price at intermediate decreases
more than at the higher level.
The size and the direction of the equilibrium e⁄ects depend on the degree of subtitutabil-
ity between aggregate labor inputs. The results of the estimation of the production function
in Section 4.1.2 show that there are complementarities in production between intermediate
and higher education. If higher and intermediate education are more complementary than
higher and basic (or intermediate and basic), in addition to the standard supply e⁄ect, an
increase in H2 further decreases the relative return to intermediate with respect to basic
education and increases the relative return to higher with respect to basic education.
Figure 3: Steady State Skill Prices With Skill-Biased Technological Change and Production


































Figure 3 quanti￿es the importance of the complementarities between intermediate and
higher education. I de￿ne a second counterfactual, Scenario II, which assumes that the
production function is isoelastic, that is ￿ = ￿ and therefore ESu;s = ES1;2 = ES1;3 =
ES2;3 = 1
1￿￿.
As it is clear from Figure 3, in the absence of complementarities between intermediate
and higher education, the equilibrium price schedule is back to being a linear function of the
level of education.
28Scenario I does match the ￿rst feature of the convexi￿cation, that is the increase in the
relative returns to higher education and the decline in the relative returns to intermediate
education. However, it does not match the second feature of the convex shift, that is the
drop of the price at intermediate below the value at baseline. The extent of the decrease of
the price at intermediate depends on the size of the supply increase at this level. The main
constraint that prevents the supply to increase is the extent of the credit constraints. All
the simulations up to now have been obtained by keeping all structural parameters ￿xed at
baseline values. At baseline B = 0, that is borrowing is not allowed. Starting from Scenario
I, I now assess the impact of allowing for borrowing.
5.2 Skill-biased technological change and relaxation of the credit
constraints
I de￿ne a third counterfactual, Scenario III, that is given by Scenario I with a relaxation of
the credit constraints to the upper bound of the values that B can take.38 Figure 4 reports
the price schedule at steady state in the baseline and in Scenario I and III.
With respect to Scenario I, the possibility of borrowing allows more people to complete
intermediate and higher education, so investment in human capital at both levels increases
and therefore the equilibrium prices at intermediate and higher education decrease. However,
the supply increase at intermediate level does not translate into a proportional increase at
higher education, so the price at intermediate decreases more than at the higher level.
As expected, there is a positive relationship between the borrowing limit and the size
of the supply increase at intermediate: the more it is possible to borrow, the higher is the
investment in education after compulsory schooling. Unreported results show that there is
a borrowing threshold of around forty per cent of individuals￿lifetime earnings below which
38As I discussed in section 3.1, the internal consistency of the model allows to set an upper bound for the
value that B can take at any age, which is given by the present discounted value of the lifetime earnings
at age a under the lowest possible realization of the idiosyncratic education-speci￿c shock zj. Given the
distribution of zj de￿ned over a ￿nite support with a minimum value, zj, and a maximum value, zj, zj
de￿nes the lowest possible value that zj can take. I compute ei
j;a =
￿
￿i + gj(agei) + zj
￿
. At each age a,












(1+r)t where r is the world interest rate.
29Figure 4: Steady State Skill Prices With Skill-Biased Technological Change and Relaxation


































the size of the supply increase at intermediate is not enough to produce a sizeable decrease
in the equilibrium price below the value at baseline.
Scenario III presents both of the two features that characterize the convexi￿cation in
Mexico: with respect to the baseline model, the relative return to higher versus intermediate
education increases, the relative return to intermediate versus basic education decreases and
the price at intermediate lies below the value at baseline.39
6 Model￿ s assessment
For a quantitative assessment of the model￿ s performance we can compare the growth of
the skill prices and the relative returns computed from the simulations and from the data.
The second column of Table 2 and 3 presents, respectively, the growth of the level and of
the relative log education prices between 1987 and 2002 estimated from equation (21) with
the ENEU data; columns three to six present, respectively, the growth of the level and of
the relative log education prices computed at steady state in each of the three simulated
39An additional constraint to an increase in the supply of education is given by the extent of earnings￿
risk. Negative shocks can change the fortune of dynasties that are born rich and prevent some families to
￿nance investments into higher education. A proxy for earnings￿risk is given by the value of the estimated
variances of the earnings as reported in Table 6 in Appendix C. Simulation results show that in the absence
of a relaxation of the credit constraints changes in earnings￿risk on their own would not be able to produce
the convexi￿cation. All results are available from the author upon request.
30scenarios with respect to the baseline model. The change in both the level of the skill prices
and in the relative returns in Scenario III is close in magnitude to the ones estimated from
the ENEU.
Log education prices ENEU (1987-2002) Scenario I Scenario II Scenario III
Basic ￿3% ￿2% ￿7% ￿2%
Intermediate ￿5% 3% 7% ￿6%
Higher 6% 16% 17% 10%
Table 2: Growth of the Log Education Prices in the ENEU Data Between 1987 and 2002
and in the Three Simulations With Respect to the Baseline Model
Log relative education prices ENEU (1987-2002) Scenario I Scenario II Scenario III
Higher versus Intermediate 72% 69% 55% 75%
Higher versus Basic 25% 52% 64% 34%
Intermediate versus Basic ￿15% 28% 78% ￿26%
Table 3: Growth of the Relative Log Education Prices in the ENEU Data Between 1987 and
2002 and in the Three Simulations With Respect to the Baseline Model
Overall, the simulations show two important results: ￿rst, consistently with the prelimi-
nary evidence presented in Section 2.1, the convexi￿cation was not driven by changes in the
composition of ability but rather by changes in the prices of skills. Second, the changes in
the prices resulted from the supply response to an increased demand for skilled labour in the
presence of production complementarities between intermediate and higher education and a
relaxation of the credit constraints on the supply of human capital.
I now assess the robustness of both these two results starting with the changes in the
ability composition. The changes in the supply of education that resulted into the convexi￿ed
pro￿le did modify the ability composition by level of education. Table 4 presents the mean
and the standard deviation of the ability distribution by education at Baseline and in Scenario
III. As expected, the supply increase of intermediate-educated resulted into a sharp decline
of the mean ability level for this group and into an increase in the mean ability at basic
education. Due to the entrance of low-ability individuals together with high-ability ones
the mean ability level did also decline at higher education. However, the reduction in mean
ability at intermediate was of a much bigger magnitude than the one at higher education.
31Therefore, with respect to the Baseline, in Scenario III the ability gap between higher and
intermediate education increased sharply.
Ability by Education Baseline Scenario III
mean sd mean sd
Basic ￿0:226 0:396 0:311 0:276
Intermediate 0:396 0:314 ￿0:191 0:436
Higher 0:615 0:283 0:358 0:536
Table 4: Mean and Standard Deviation of Ability by Education at Baseline and in Scenario
III
The quantitative importance of the changes in ability composition is sensitive to the
speci￿c ability distribution estimated from the data. There could be a given initial ability
distribution such that a big enough drop in mean ability at intermediate and a big enough
increase in mean ability at higher education would produce a convexi￿ed wage pro￿le as a
result of compositional changes. We can simulate the model when we arbitrarily change the
moments of the initial ability distribution. However, in the absence of a benchmark value for
the changes in ability composition, it is not clear what a meaningful or reasonable change in
these moments is.
To the best of my knowledge, Binelli, Meghir and Menezes-Filho (2009) is the only paper
that provides an estimate of the changes in the ability composition by level of education in
a Latin American country in the 1990s. Binelli et al. (2009) distinguish between four levels
of schooling and estimate the changes in ability composition by education and birth cohort
during the Brazilian educational expansion in the 1990s.
The estimates of Binelli et al. (2009) provide a precise benchmark of the magnitude of
the shifts in ability composition by level of education in Latin America in the decade of the
1990s and can therefore be used for a robustness test of the quantitative importance of the
changes in the composition of ability to produce the convexi￿cation.
I simulate the model at constant skill prices and I compute the changes in mean ability
that would be necessary to produce the convexi￿ed pro￿le. Unreported results show that the
mean ability level at intermediate education would have had to decrease ￿ve times more than
the relative decrease in ability at this level that Binelli et al. (2008) estimate for Brazil. So,
it was not changes in ability composition per se to produce the convexi￿cation but rather a
32combination of composotional changes and changes in the prices of education with the latter
being of fundamental importance.
I now turn to the second main result of the simulations, that is that the changes in
the prices of education resulted from the interaction between the demand and the supply
of education. As it is clear from equations (12) to (14), the same changes in the prices
of education that characterize the convexi￿ed pro￿le in Scenario III could be obtained by
changing the share of skilled and unskilled labor so that the demand for education changes
while the supply of education does not. Unreported results show that by keeping the supply
of education constant at the values observed in 1987, the increase in the demand for skilled
labour that was necessary to produce the convexi￿ed pro￿le would be more than three times
bigger than the 1.35 per cent a year estimated from the data. So, the supply response to the
increased demand for skilled labor was a crucial determinant of the convex shift.
As for the two mechanisms via which the changes in the supply resulted into the changes
in the prices of education, both the production complementarities and the relaxation of
the credit constraints do ￿nd empirical support. The production complementaries between
medium and highly educated workers are consistent with an economy with two main sectors,
a ￿rst one that employs low-skilled labor and a second one where production is carried out
by using semi and high-skilled labor. This structure of production is a good description of
the Mexican economy that is characterized by two main sectors: a formal sector of semi and
high-skilled workers and an informal sector of low-skilled workers.40
As for the relaxation of the credit constraints, the decade of the 1990s in Mexico was
characterized by a process of ￿nancial liberalization and deregulation of the securities mar-
kets, which resulted into an increased availability of consumer credit. Evidence from the
Bank of Mexico shows that in 2002 the amount of credit to consumers was almost double
the size the amount in 1994.41
Finally, the model abstracts from a number of facts that could have potentially been
40By de￿ning a worker as "formal" if paying social security contributions in either the private or the public
sector, evidence from the Mexican Employment Survey shows that in the 1990s almost eighty per cent of
formal sector workers have at least completed high school education.
41The most recent available data show that the steep increase in consumer credit continues: at the end of
the year 2008 the total amount of credit to consumers was almost three times the size of the amount granted
in 2002.
33important to explain the convexi￿cation. First, I do not model changes in wage setting
institutions such as the minimum wage or the level of unionization. As discussed by Maloney
and Nunez (2003), in Latin America the impact of the changes in labor market institutions
was mainly concentrated at the bottom end of the distribution. It could be that the extent
of the fall of the wages at basic education was limited by the presence of binding minimum
wages. However, with the exception of Colombia, the empirical evidence for Latin America
suggests that in the 1990s minimum wages were not binding.42 The evidence for Mexico
shows that the drop in the mean wages at basic education was of a much smaller size than
the one of the minimum wages: between 1987 and 2002 minimum wages declined in real
terms by around 47 per cent while wages at basic education decreased by less than four
percentage points.
Second, I do not model social welfare programs and education subsidies that give incen-
tives to invest in education. In Mexico the main education programs (the most famous one
being "Progresa" later called "Opportunidades") started at the end of the 1990s, so they
can not the main determinant of the convex wage shift that arise during the 1990s.
Third, I do not model migration. In the 1990s there were vast migration ￿ ows from
Mexico to the US. However, the Mexixo-US migration was mainly an out￿ ow of low-skilled
workers with two thirds of the adult Mexican immigrants having not completed intermediate
education.43 The low-skilled migration on its own could not explain the double change
in the relative wages even if it could have contributed to reduce the fall in the wage at
basic education and therefore to produce the decline in the relative returns to intermediate
education.44 It could be interesting to disentangle the downward pressure on wages due to
the demand decrease for low-skilled workers and the upper pressure due to the migration of
this type of workers to the US. This is left for future research.
42See Maloney and Nunez (2003) and Bosch and Manacorda (2008).
43Report of the US Center for Immigration Studies, 2001 that is available at www.cis.org
44Also, migration does not seem to be a root cause of the convexi￿cation since vast migration out￿ ows
were observed in the 1990s from Mexico but not from the other countries that were also characterized by a
change of the wage pro￿le from linear to convex.
347 Conclusion
This paper studies a central feature that characterizes the changes in wage inequality in
the decade of the 1990s in many countries: the relationship between log wages and the
level of education convexi￿ed. The higher-intermediate wage di⁄erential increased and the
intermediate-basic wage di⁄erential declined.
These wage changes have important implications for the process of human capital accu-
mulation. The non-linearity of the wage function changes the opportunity costs of investing
in education which becomes pro￿table only if college is completed. This may induce the
poor to drop out of school or even not to invest in human capital at all if they cannot a⁄ord
￿nancing education up to the end of college. In addition, a convex wage pro￿le implies that
inequality is growing faster at the top rather than at the bottom of the wage distribution with
increasing bene￿ts for the very rich, which raises serious equity and distributional concerns.
I show that the changes in both the relative wages and in the level of wages can be
explained by a two-way interaction between the demand and the supply of education. The
production complementarities between intermediate and higher education are responsible
for the double change in the wage di⁄erentials while a relaxation of the credit constraints
explains the drop of the wage at intermediate and therefore the extent of the convexi￿cation.
This argument is supported by an empirical equilibrium model of savings and educational
choices estimated with micro-data for Mexico.
The mechanism proposed in this paper cannot pretend to be a complete explanation of
the changes in wage inequality. The intention is not to provide a model that gives a universal
answer, but rather a framework that shows how accounting for the structure of production
and the interaction between the demand and the supply of education is of key importance
to explain the evolution of wage inequality.
Then I believe that the exact mechanisms through which the demand and the supply
interact and result into the observed wage changes are country-speci￿c. Two interesting
case studies would be the US and the booming economies of East Asia. In the US changes
in labor market institutions rather than credit constraints45 and complementarities between
45Lemieux (2007) ￿nds that changes in labor market institutions can account for around a third of the
changes in low-end and top-end wage inequality in the US in the 1990s.
35skilled labour and physical capital rather than between intermediate and higher educated46
could be two important model￿ s additions to explain the determinants of the convexi￿cation.
In the fast growing economies of East Asia an important factor to include in the model could
be international trade.47
Finally, this paper provides a framework to address an interesting and related question
concerning the timing of the convexi￿cation. Following the recent empirical literature on
dynamic equilibrium models48, the model could be used to study the economies in transition
from the beginning to the end of the 1990s. The aim would be to explain the dynamics of
changes in the prices and in the distribution of education that resulted into the convex wage
shift. A welfare analysis of who has been winning and losing during the transition and by
how much would complete the quantitative exercise. This is left for future research.
46Using US data and a model of endogenous technological adoption, Beaudry and Green (2005) argue
that capital-skill complementarities could be the main factor explaining the changes in the level of low-
skilled wages and in the high-low skilled wage di⁄erential. Beaudry and Green (2003) show that capital-skill
complementarities could be the main determinant of the di⁄erences between the changes in wage inequality
observed in the US and in Germany from the beginning of the 1980s to the mid 1990s.
47Wood (2002) proposes a uni￿ed theory based on falling co-operation costs between rich and poor countries
that induce a decrease in wage inequality in the lower part of the distribution and an increase in the upper
part of the distribution in the rich countries. Using US data, Anderson, Tang and Wood (2006) provide
supporting empirical evidence to the qualitative predictions of the model.
48See, for example, Lee and Wolpin (2006) and Johnson and Keane (2007).
36References
[1] Arrau, Patricio, and Sweder van Wijnbergen. 1991. "Intertemporal Substitution, Risk
Aversion and Private Savings in Mexico." The World Bank Working Paper Series 682.
[2] Atkinson, Anthony. 2002. "Top Incomes in the United Kingdom over the Twentieth
Century." Oxford University Discussion Papers in Economic and Social History 43.
[3] Autor, David H., Lawrence F. Katz, and Melissa S. Kearney. 2006. "The Polarization
of the U.S. Labor Market." American Economic Review, 96: 198-194.
[4] Banerjee, Abhijit, and Thomas Piketty. 2005. "Top Indian Incomes." World Bank Eco-
nomic Review, 19(1): 1-20.
[5] Beaudry, Paul, and David A. Green. 2003. "The Changing Structure of Wages in the
US and Germany: What explains the di⁄erences?" American Economic Review, 93(3):
573-603.
[6] Beaudry, Paul, and David A. Green. 2005. "Changes in U.S. Wages 1976-2000: Ongoing
Skill Bias or Major Technological Change?" Journal of Labor Economics, 23(3).
[7] Binelli, Chiara, and Orazio Attanasio. Forthcoming. "Mexico in the 1990s: the Main
Cross-Sectional Facts." Review of Economic Dynamics.
[8] Binelli, Chiara, Costas Meghir, and Naercio Menezes-Filho. 2009. "Educational Attain-
ment and Wages in Brazil." Unpublished.
[9] Bosch, Mariano, and Marco Manacorda. 2008. "Minimum Wages and Earnings Inequal-
ity in Urban Mexico. Revisiting the Evidence." CEP Discussion Paper 880.
[10] Bosworth, Barry. 1998. "Productivity Growth in Mexico."
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/1998/07_mexico_bosworth.aspx.
[11] Bouillon, Cesar, Arianna Legovini, and Nora Lustig. 2005. "Can Education Explain
Changes in Income Inequality in Mexico?" In The Microeconomics of Income Distrib-
ution Dynamics in East Asia and Latin America, ed. Francois Bourguignon, Francisco
H. G. Ferreira, and Nora Lustig. Washington DC: The World Bank.
37[12] DeschŒnes, Olivier. 2002. "Unobserved Ability, Comparative Advantage and the
Rising Return to Education in the United States: A Cohort-Based Approach."
http://www.econ.ucsb.edu/~olivier/research.html.
[13] Feenberg, Daniel R., James M. Poterba. 2000. "The Income and Tax Share of Very
High-Income Households, 1960-1995." American Economic Review, 90(2): 264-270.
[14] Gallipoli, Giovanni, Costas Meghir, and Gianluca Violante. 2007. "Equi-
librium E⁄ects of Education Policies: a Quantitative Evaluation."
http://www.econ.ubc.ca/ggallipoli/research.html.
[15] Goldberg, Pinelopi K., and Nina Pavcnik. 2004. "Trade, Inequality, and Poverty: What
Do I Know? Evidence from recent trade liberalization episodes in developing countries."
Brookings Trade Forum 2004, Washington DC: Brookings Institute.
[16] Goldin, Claudia, and Lawrence F. Katz. 2007. "Long-Run Changes in the Wage Struc-
ture: Narrowing, Widening, Polarizing." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2.
[17] Goos, Maarten, and Alan Manning. 2003. "Lousy and Lovely Jobs: The Rising Polar-
ization of Work in Britain." CEP Discussion Paper 640.
[18] Harrison, Ann. 1996. "Openness and Growth: A Time Series, Cross-Country Analysis
for Developing Countries." Journal of Developing Economics, 48: 419-47.
[19] Heckman, James J., Lance Lochner, and Christopher Taber.1998. "Explaining Raising
Wage Inequality: Explorations with a Dynamic General Equilibrium Model of Labour
Earnings with Heterogeneous Agents." Review of Economic Dynamics, 1:1-58.
[20] HernÆndez, Mercedes, Adolfo ChÆvez , and Hector Bourges. 1987. "Valor nutritivo de
los alimentos mexicanos. Tablas de uso prÆctico." Publication L-12 10a edition, Mexico.
Instituto Nacional de Nutricion INN.
[21] Ho⁄man, Andre￿ . 1993. "Economic Development in Latin America in the 20th Century:
A Comparative Perspective." in Explaining Economic Growth, ed. Adam Szirmai, Bart
van Ark, and Dirk Pilat. New York: North Holland.
38[22] Jacoby, Hana G., and Emmanuel Skou￿as. 2002. "Financial Constraints on higher edu-
cation: Evidence from Mexico." Unpublished.
[23] Johnson, Matthew, and Michael P. Keane. 2007. "A Dynamic Equilibrium Model of the
U.S. Wage Structure, 1968-1996." Unpublished.
[24] Katz, Lawrence F., and Kevin M. Murphy K. 1992. "Changes in Relative Wages, 1963-
1987: Supply and Demand Factors." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(1): 35-78.
[25] Lemieux, Thomas. 2006. "Post-secondary Education and Increasing Wage Inequality,"
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 96(2): 195-199.
[26] Lemieux, Thomas. 2007. "The Changing Nature of Wage Inequality."
http://www.econ.ubc.ca/lemieux/recent.htm.
[27] Lee, Donghoon, and Kenneth Wolpin. 2006. "Accounting for Wage and Employment
Changes in the U.S. from 1968-2000: A Dynamic Model of Labor Market Equilibrium."
PIER Working Paper 06-005.
[28] Liu, Amy Y. C. 2006. "Changing Wage Structure and Education in Vietnam, 1992-
1998." Economics of Transitions, 14(4): 681￿ 706.
[29] Lopez Boo, Florencia. 2008. "The Evolution of Returns to Schooling in Argentina."
Unpublished.
[30] Maloney, William F., and Jairo Nunez. 2003. "Measuring the Impact of Minimum
Wages: Evidence from Latin America." NBER Working Paper 9800.
[31] Manacorda, Marco, Carolina Sanchez-Paramo, and Norbert R. Schady. Forthcoming
￿ O⁄ and Running? Technology, Trade, and the Rising Demand for Skilled Workers in
Latin America.￿Industrial and Labor Relations Review.
[32] Mookherjee, Dilip, and Debraj Ray. 2008. "Inequality and Markets."
http://www.nyu.edu/econ/user/debraj/.
[33] Patrinos, Harry A., and George Psacharopoulos. 2004. "Returns to Investment in Edu-
cation: A Further Update." Education Economics, 12( 2): 111-134.
39[34] Piketty, Thomas. 2005. "Top income shares in the long run: an overview." Journal of
the European Economic Association, 3-4(3): 1-11.
[35] Piketty, Thomas, and Emmanuel Saez. 2003. "Income Inequality in the United States
1913-1998." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 68(1): 1-39.
[36] Robbins, Donald J. 1996. "Evidence on Trade and Wages in the Developing World."
OECD Development Center Technical Paper 119.
[37] Schady, Norbert R. 2001. "Convexity and Sheepkin E⁄ects in the Human Capital Earn-
ings Function. Recent Evidence for Filipino Men." World Bank Policy Research Working
Paper 2566.
[38] S￿derbom, Mans, Francis Teal, Anthony Wambugu, and Godius Kahyarara. 2006. "The
Dynamics of Returns to Education in Kenyan and Tanzanian Manufacturing manufac-
turing." Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 68(3): 261-288 .
[39] Spitz-Oener, Alexandra. 2006. "Technical Change, Job Tasks and Rising Educational
Demands: Looking Outside the Wage Structure." Journal of Labor Economics, 24.
[40] Verhoogen, Eric A. 2008. "Trade, Quality Upgrading and Wage Inequality in the Mex-
ican Manufacturing Sector." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(2).
[41] Winters, Alan, Neil McCulloch, and Andrew McKay. 2004. "Trade Liberalization and
Poverty: the Evidence So Far." Journal of Economic Literature, 62: 72-115.
[42] Wood, Adrian. 2002. "Globalization and Wage Inequalities: A Synthesis of Three The-
ories." Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 138: 54-82.
[43] Anderson, Edward, Paul J. G. Tang, and Adrian Wood. 2006. "Globalization, co-
operation costs and wage inequalities." Oxford Economic Papers, 58: 569-595.
40NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Appendix A - ENEU
The ENEU (Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano) is the Mexican national employment
survey collected yearly by the Mexican national statistical o¢ ce, INEGI. The ENEU has a
structure similar to the US Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). It is a quarterly household
survey that collects individual-level data and it has a rotating panel structure: households
are interviewed for ￿ve consecutive quarters and in each quarter twenty per cent of the
households are replaced by new households that are interviewed for the ￿rst time. The
survey started in 1981 with progressive increase of the geographic coverage. The sample is
selected to be geographically and socio economically representative of the Mexican urban
population: by the end of the 1990s it covered approximately sixty two per cent of the
national urban population and ninety two per cent of the cities with population greater than
one hundred thousand people. By the end of the 1990s, approximately seventy four per cent
of the Mexican population lived in urban areas. Recent rounds of the ENEU have national
coverage, but since the earlier ones survey urban areas only, I restrict the sample to urban
areas in all years.
The main questionnaire is divided in three parts. The ￿rst part collects socio demographic
information on all household members. The second part contains detailed employment in-
formation on individuals at least twelve years old. The third part reports information on the
characteristics of the house of residence with additional questions on the characteristics of the
building, number and type of rooms and ownership status from the 1994 wave onwards. The
employment information is very detailed with several questions on individuals￿occupation
status, type and characteristics of employment, sector of main and secondary job, contract
type, number of working hours, monthly earnings, unemployment status and duration and
social security taxes paid by the worker￿ s employer in the private and public sector. Earnings
are reported net of all labor taxes and social contributions paid in either public or private
funds. I compute hourly wages as the ratio between monthly earnings and hours worked in
the main occupation last month. I de￿ ate the data using the Mexican national CPI June
2002.
41Appendix B - Solution method
This Appendix describes the method used to compute the equilibrium steady state. The
model is solved recursively by backwards induction from the last to the ￿rst period of adult
life.
Step 1. Set an initial guess for the vector of skill prices [p1;p2;p3] and assume that future
prices equal current prices.
Step 2. Solve the optimization problem in the last period of work life before retirement
(a = a).
De￿ne with V Sch
a (jP;jC
a ;Aa;p(a);￿;za) and with V Work
a (jP;jC
a ;Aa;p(a);￿;za), respec-
tively, the conditional value function of sending the child to school and to work and denote
with W Sch
a (jP
a ;Aa;p(a);￿;za) and W Work
a (jP
a ;Aa;p(a);￿;za) the initial guess for child lifetime
utility as an adult conditional on having sent the child, respectively, to school and to work
in the last period of coresidence. a denotes the age of the parent in the ￿rst period of adult
life.
Given W Sch
a (:) and W Work
a (:), V Sch
a (:) and V Work













































where r is the ￿xed real interest rate on ￿nancial assets, FjC denotes the ￿xed costs of
schooling for child education level jC and wjP;a and wjC;a are, respectively, parental and child
42wage at age a given parental (child) education level jP(jC). ￿ denotes the degree of parental
altruism and expectations are taken over next period shock to earnings, z. Equations (28)
and (29) describe the evolution of child education that increases by one unit if the child is
sent to school. The level of child education at the end of the last period of coresidence de￿nes
the (￿xed) education level throughout adulthood (jC
a = jP
a = jP). For simplicity I do not
report the credit constraints (equation (6)) and the terminal condition (equation (7)).
Step 3. Solve the conditional maximization problems in the third, second and ￿rst
period of adult life.
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where FjC is the ￿xed cost of child schooling level jC and Va+1(jC
a +1;:) and Va+1(jC
a ;:) de￿ne,
respectively, the expected value over the maximum between the conditional value functions
of the schooling and work alternative in the next period given the decision of sending the
child, respectively, to school or to work in the current period.






























a ;Aa+1;p(a + 1);￿;za+1)]
In the second period the child is sent to compulsory basic education. The maximization








s:t: ca = Aa(1 + r) + wjP;a ￿ F1 ￿ Aa+1
where F1 denotes the ￿xed costs of basic education and Va+1(1;:) de￿nes the expected
value over the maximum between the conditional value functions of the schooling and work
alternative in the next period given that the child has completed compulsory basic education













a = 1;Aa+1;p(a + 1);￿;za+1)]
where jC
a = 1 denotes completed basic education.
In the ￿rst period of adult life the child is in pre-school. Child education is normalized








s:t: ca = Aa(1 + r) + wjP;a ￿ Aa+1
Step 4. Compute the new initial guesses for W Sch
a (:) and W Work
a (:).
The solution of the model in steps two and three provides the complete set of value
functions and optimal saving rules for any combination of the state space variables. The
optimal value function in the ￿rst period of adulthood, Va, provides a new initial guess for
child lifetime utility. Denoting with jC
a the level of education of the child at the end of
44the last period of coresidence, Va(jP = (jC
a + 1);Aa;p(a)) provides the new initial guess for
W Sch
a (:) and Va(jP = jC
a ;Aa;p(a)) provides the new initial guess for W Work
a (:). Given the
new initial guesses for W Sch
a (:) and W Work
a (:), I repeat steps two and three above.
Given the conditional value functions for the work and schooling alternative, the child
is sent to school when the expected value of investing in schooling is at least as high as the











a ;Aa;p(a);￿;za) 8 a = a_ed;:::a
where a_ed denotes parental age when child education becomes a choice variable.















where " is an arbitrarily small number and jj:jj denotes the distance between the condi-
tional value functions in the ￿rst period of adulthood in two consecutive iterations.
Step 6. Compute the equilibrium skill prices as marginal productivities of the human
capital factors using the equilibrium conditions set in equations (12) to (14).
Compute a new guess for the vector of the skill prices as a linear combination of the guess
used to solve the model and the equilibrium prices computed in this iteration.
Step 7. Repeat steps two to six with the new guess for the vector of the skill prices.
Stop when the di⁄erence between each element of the vector of the equilibrium skill prices
and the initial guess for this price is arbitrarily small.
45Appendix C - Estimation and calibration
This Appendix gives details of the estimation of the wage equations and the production
function and of the model￿ s calibration.
Wage equations








qr) ￿ lnwj;qr ￿ ￿
i (30)
I use the residuals from the wage equation to obtain an estimate of the distribution of the
idiosyncratic shock. I assume that zj;qr is a normally distributed i.i.d. shock with mean zero
and variance ￿2
zj. I use the second moment of the distribution of zj;qr for each education group
to parametrize the distribution of z in the model. For 1987 I ￿nd b ￿
2





z3 = 0:079. Table 5 presents the estimated variances for each year of the sample between
1987 and 2002.
Finally, the coe¢ cients of the quadratic polynomials gj(agei
qr) provide the estimates of
the education-speci￿c experience e⁄ects in quarter qr. Table 6 presents the (yearly rescaled)
estimates of the age and age squared term for each education group and year between 1987
and 2002.
Table 5: Estimation Wage Equations: Variance of the Residuals (Source: ENEU)
Figure 5 presents the empirical frequencies of ￿ obtained for 1987, the ￿rst year of the
sample. The ￿rst and second moment of the distribution of ￿ are used to parametrize the
46Table 6: Estimation Wage Equations: Age Polynomials (Source: ENEU)
Figure 5: Estimation of the Wage Equations: Ability Distribution in 1987 (Source: ENEU)
initial distribution of ability. I ￿nd b ￿
2
￿ = 0:25 and b ￿￿ = 0.
Production function
Panel A and B in Figure 6 report the total number of workers and the wage bills by level
of education for each year between 1987 and 2002. The drop of the wage bills between 1994
and 1996 is the result of the Peso crisis that hit Mexico in 1994: the total wage bill declined
in real terms by around 29 per cent at basic education and by around 35 and 48 per cent at
intermediate and higher education. Wages started increasing again steadily for all education
levels from the end of the 1990s.
Panel A and B in Figure 7 present the series of the estimated skill prices and human
capital stocks normalized to 1987. As in the aggregate wage bills, the impact of the Peso
47crisis does also show up in the skill prices: between 1994 and 1996 the log skill price decreased
by around twelve per cent at basic and by around ten per cent at intermediate and higher
education.
Figure 6: Total Number of Wage Workers and Total Wage Bills by Level of Education in
Mexico (Source: ENIGH)
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Figure 7: Estimated Log Skill Prices and Human Capital Aggregates in Mexico Normalized
to 1987 (Source: author￿ s calculations based on ENIGH and ENEU data)
























Figure 8 reports the complete list of the calibrated parameters together with their value,
a brief description and the target used to calibrate the model.
Figure 8: Model￿ s Calibration
Parameter  Value  Description  Target 
t  7 years  Model period  Average length working life of 
adult Mexican workers 
r  0.41  Real interest rate  Average real interest rate US 6-
months Treasury Bills 1990-2000 
β  0.71  Discount factor  1/(1+r) 
γ  0.9  Relative risk aversion 
Elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution estimated for LACs 
(Arrau and Wijnbergen, 1991)  
B  0  Limit on net indebtedness  Maximum level of credit 
constraints 
λ  1  Parental altruism  Parent-child dynasties linked by 
fully altruistic preferences 
α  0.35  Share physical capital in 
production 
Share physical capital estimated 
for LACs in the 1990s (Harrison, 
1996 and Hoffman, 1993) 
F_1  0.035  Fixed cost basic education 
Proportion workers aged 25-60 
with basic education in ENEU 
1987 
F_2  0.26  Fixed cost intermediate education 
Proportion workers aged 25-60 
with intermediate education in 
ENEU 1987 
F_3  0.64  Fixed cost higher education 
Proportion workers aged 25-60 
with higher education in ENEU 
1987 
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